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Abstract
Science-art collaborations are a growth area. An example is the Wellcome Collection exhibition “States of 
Mind”. I focus on one work yellowbluepink by Ann Veronica Janssens. As framed within the exhibition this 
piece is understood to present a model of spectatorship in which the art-encounter prompts an awareness of 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  of neuroscientific self-understanding. I take it that science-art projects want to spread this 
celebration of “objective thought”; this is their realist agenda. The scientific framing of yellowbluepink fails in 
this regard because of a striking contradiction at its heart. The dominant art historical interpretation of this 
piece includes a spectator who is “decentred”, u n a b l e  to know him or herself. This contradiction creates 
a methodological problem for the project, one that negatively impacts its ability to a mbi t iou s l y  promote 
its agenda. On the basis of this analysis I sketch out the conditions for an ambitious project. It would need 
to acknowledge the “artworld” and it would require the invention of a new model of spectatorship, one that 
promoted (self)-awareness of humankinds’ impressive epistemic capacity. This anti-phenomenological figure 
is formulated with reference to the nemocentric subject. 
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Introduction
Science-art collaborations, hybrid projects combining scientific ideas and contemporary art, are increasingly 
visible: they have a burgeoning cultural currency.1 In the UK, the popularity and profile of the Wellcome 
Collection’s exhibition programme exemplifies this trend. These shows are one component of the extensive 
public engagement strategy employed by the Wellcome Trust, a London based biomedical research charity.2 
This article focuses on one Wellcome Collection exhibition, more specifically, one particular artwork, yellow-
bluepink by Ann Veronica Janssens, a dramatic experiential installation incorporating dense mist and coloured 
light, as it was framed within the exhibition ‘States of Mind: Tracing the Edges of Consciousness’.3 Wellcome 
Collection described the show as bringing together “perspectives from artists, psychologists, philosophers and 
neuroscientists to interrogate our understanding of the conscious experience”. In this context Janssen’s instal-
lation was framed by, or aligned with, scientific ideas; not exclusively scientific notions, it is true, but these were 
very much to the fore. This is evinced by those writings that contextualised yellowbluepink, especially a piece by 
neuroscientist Anil Seth, which I shall quote from and interpret anon. My article reads this contextualisation, or 
framing, as attempting to – in part – engender spectators of yellowbluepink to interpret their conscious experi-
ence of the work in a manner that is sympathetic to science. What I mean by this is that scientific knowledge is 
taken by the spectator to provide legitimate explanatory material, i.e. looked upon sympathetically. This material 
is thereby incorporated by the spectator into her interpretation of the experiential encounter with the work. In 
this reading, speculative explanations of the encounter are sought in, or aligned with, scientific knowledge. 
This type of interpretation, I will argue, is premised upon a spectatorial recognition that objective knowl-
edge is p o s s i b le . More specifically, I shall claim that yellowbluepink vis-à-vis “States of Mind” aims to prompt 
an awareness in its spectator of the possibility of neuroscientific self-understanding. (This statement shall be 
further explained in the next section of the article.) I do not see this “framing” or “engendering” as problem-
atic, some suspicious attempt to direct or determine the art encounter, one that some might desire to be entirely 
open-ended. Rather, I view this contextualisation of yellowbluepink, and the production of interpretations in 
sympathy with scientific knowledge, as part of a laudable effort by Wellcome to engage the public, to spread 
enthusiasm for, and literacy in, scientific knowledge.
That most science-art projects are involved in this engagement agenda, or soft-promotion is – I think 
– not a controversial claim. For instance, the Wellcome Trust publishes reports online about its ambitions on 
this front. One states that the organisation aims to create a situation in which ‘the public can engage in informed 
debate with scientists’ and that it intends for “[t]he public [to] value science.” It is clear that the Trust desires 
1) Several recent publications cover the subject. For instance, see, Stephen Wilson,
Art + Science Now: How Scientific Research and Technological Innovation are Becoming Key to 21st-Century Aesthetics, (London: Thames 
& Hudson, 2010); and, Arthur Miller, Colliding Worlds: How Cutting-edge Science is Redefining Contemporary Art (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 201). That Central Saint Martins now offers a postgraduate qualification titled ‘MA Art and Science’ further 
evidences this topicality. See: “MA Art and Science,” Central Saint Martins, Course Summary, accessed 20 July 2017,
 http://www.arts.ac.uk/csm/courses/postgraduate/ma-art-and-science/ .
2) See: “Public Engagement Team,” Wellcome Trust, accessed 20 July 2017, 
https://wellcome.ac.uk/what-we-do/teams/public-engagement-team.
3) Janssens’ installation ran from 1 October 201 - 3 January 2016. The “States of Mind” exhibition, of which yellowbluepink was 
one component, concluded in October 2016.
) “States of Mind: Tracing the edges of consciousness,”, Exhibiotions, Wellcome Collection, accessed 8 November 2017, 
https://wellcomecollection.org/exhibitions/states-mind-tracing-edges-consciousness .
) Alison Dunn and Robin Vincent, Engaging Science: Evaluating Public Engagement in the Wellcome Trust’s UK Centres, Wellcome 
Trust, accessed 20 July 2017, https://wellcome.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wtp09889_0.pdf , 6.
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to promote scientific understanding, that which can facilitate “informed debate”, and to do so via exhibitions 
(as well as the many other means of engagement at its disposal). Whilst there isn’t the space here to offer a full 
survey of science-art projects and their ambitions, I can draw attention to a recent article for the online photog-
raphy magazine Photo District News titled The Rise of Science-focused Artist Residencies – and How to Take 
Part. This piece is full of enthusiastic statements by figures such as Valentine Kass, the program director of the 
Berkshire Museum. Speaking of the National Science Foundation’s Antarctic Artists and Writers program, she 
states that it is “a way to increase the public understanding and appreciation of the Antarctic and the impor-
tance of the scientific work going on there”.6 Again, artistic endeavour is the mechanism for a soft-promotion 
of scientific ideas.
In addition, as is implicit in some of my statements above, I understand this engagement agenda to be 
based on an understanding of science as realist; I shall, therefore, name science-art’s ambition on this front its 
“realist agenda”. To view science as realist, is to understand it to be able to make tractable yet revisable claims 
about the world as it is. This perspective is the one held by most practitioners of science, either explicitly or 
tacitly, and indeed, I would argue, by the general public.7 This realism differs from the constructivist under-
standing of science, which is entirely sceptical about the possibility of conceptualising the “in itself”.8 When 
I say that science-art projects are involved in a soft-promotion of scientific literacy, I understand this knowledge 
to be realist, ergo science-art has realist agenda.
Another characteristic of the realist account of science is that it is understood as providing insight into 
aspects of reality, microphysical, or otherwise inaccessible that cannot be encountered via unaided experience. 
Conceptual rationality is taken here to be the mechanism by which the limitations of our ‘manifest image’ of 
the world are transcended, thereby enabling fuller accounts of the real. Later, I draw on Peter Wolfendale to 
fully flesh out this sketch of rational realism. When I discuss scientific endeavour, activity, or thought in this 
paper it is rational realism that I have in mind. 
It is my contention that science-art’s agenda marries-up well with a new realist mood within the humani-
ties. As is evident in the following quotation, this topic is undergoing a renewal in philosophy (as well as those 
disciplines such as contemporary art that keep an eye on philosophy), “Realism and materialism have become 
important watchwords in intellectual cultural discourse today”.9 In the same text the editors present this renewal 
as a matter of urgency, a question of philosophy’s relevance to, and purchase upon, the biggest questions of our 
age.10 I think that this new realist shift, particularly as represented by the philosophy of Ray Brassier and Peter 
Wolfendale, is significant, and I agree that it has much to offer contemporary intellectual and political life. My 
article is an attempt to contribute to this milieu. In fact, an allegiance to the philosophical renewal of realism 
6) Conor Risch, The Rise of Science-focused Artist Residencies – and How to Take Part, Photo District News, accessed 8 November 
2017, https://www.pdnonline.com/features/industry-updates/rise-science-focused-artist-residencies-take-part/ .
7) As Quentin Meillassoux has said: “One [scientist] does not validate a measure just to demonstrate that this measure is valid for 
all scientists; one validates it in order to determine what is measured.” Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity 
of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 17. To parse his point here, scientists do not think their findings are 
only of “relativist” interest to humans, true only for us, rather they understand them to have the ability to “track” what is measured, 
i.e. to provide traction upon the real. In relation to my point about “the general public” I agree with Philip Kitcher when he states 
that: “[f]ew are born antirealists, and those who achieve antirealism typically do so because it is thrust upon them by arguments they 
feel unable to answer.” Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions (New York: 
OUP, 1993), 131.
8) For an account of, and argument against, several different constructivist theories of science, see: ibid, 127–178.
9) Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, Graham Harman, eds. The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: repress, 
2011), 1.
10) Ibid., 3
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lies behind my support of science-art, it is, if you like, the normative dimension of my reading of these proj-
ects. As per the evidence above I think that these projects do aim to increase scientific literacy, and, as per my 
commitment to new realist philosophy, I think they ou g ht  to do so. 
However, whilst I whole-heartedly support the realist agenda of science-art projects it is my sense that 
not enough serious attention is given by these projects to the choice of artworks that, it is hoped, will carry 
this agenda. Specifically, these projects often ignore the art historical/theoretical discourses that surround and 
shape particular genres of art. This inattention causes, or so it seems to me, these projects to “drop the ball” 
in this regard. Whilst not able to pursue this general criticism here, I will try to prove a more specific point; 
Janssen’s piece is not an appropriate carrier for a truly ambitious increase in public enthusiasm for, and literacy 
in, scientific knowledge. What constitutes an “ambitious increase”, in the terms of my argument, is a growth 
in those numbers of people that are “enthusiastic and literate” that is greater in number than the visitor count 
for any particular science-art project. This ambitious increase can only be achieved, I argue, by the shaping of 
values at the level of social discourse. 
In the next section I will outline my critique of yellowbluepink vis-à-vis “States of Mind” more fully, 
but, suffice to say, I think the exhibition’s realist agenda would have been better served by a different kind of 
artwork. 
Framing, Spectating & Contradiction
Yellowbluepink was the first in a series of changing installations, one component of the broader show. It comprised 
a room containing dense mist, accessed via an airlock of sorts. Hidden lights coloured this atmosphere and, as 
one tentatively navigated the fogged space, these shades shifted in intensity and blended together, creating an 
all-encompassing and mildly disorienting experience. Visual perception was first frustrated; initially difficult 
to see two feet ahead, it took a little while to appreciate the scale of the room, to understand its parameters. But 
this sensory delimitation was often reversed as the white fog suddenly blushed yellow, blue or pink producing 
sensory overload. Also, other visitors played an important role in the experience as they loomed into and then 
disappeared from one’s limited visual field. 
I have already claimed that “States of Mind” framed the experience of yellowbluepink in a particular way. 
This is not a casual statement, but one of central importance to my argument, in that, I understand the meaning 
of artworks to be inherently bound-up with interpretational frameworks. In other words, I follow a nuanced 
“institutional” art theoretical approach, rather than a more essentialist model.11 The former perspective recog-
nises the human spectator of, for instance, yellowbluepink as hard-wired to be experientially disoriented by the 
installation, but , it supposes that the manner in which this experience cashes out, or is u nd e r s t o o d  by the 
spectator differs according to the way in which it is discursively framed by socially sanctioned interpretations. 
The meaning of the art starts with the “material condition” of the work, but it is fully realised in and through 
these collective interpretations. It follows from this that artworks can accommodate or resist certain interpre-
tations, their particularity yielding or proving unwieldy to one or other discourse. I understand these frames 
to also often be in competition with one another, and for there to be relations of hierarchy amongst them, so 
that the more dominant frameworks hegemonise the space of interpretation.12 
11) This institutional theory of art is constructed from several sources. Insights taken from George Dickie and Arthur C. Danto are 
supplemented by resources found in ‘discourse theory’, as described in: David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, Yannis Stavrakaki, eds., 
Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 
12) Ibid., 1–16
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Another important point is that these frameworks include a “subject position” or role for the spectator, 
and these carry prescriptions about what the spectator is and can do.13 For instance, the spectator of minimal 
art under its hegemonic, phenomenologically inflected framing, is supposed, in her encounter with, say, Robert 
Morris’ mirrored cubes, to gain a heightened awareness of herself as embodied being, one able to bring about 
(via her movement) and track the changing appearance of the piece.1 In sum, then, the approach I adopt here 
stipulates that an understanding of an artwork, its operation, including the role it provides for a spectator needs 
to proceed via reference to interpretational frames. When I claim, therefore, that the “States of Mind” exhibi-
tion frames yellowbluepink it is this theoretical infrastructure that is being invoked 
The frame provided by “States of Mind” presents yellowbluepink as, I think, prompting an insight into 
human conscious experience as understood primarily, albeit tentatively, by neuroscience. This – ultimately – 
i s  the me a n i n g  of the work as “desired” by the exhibition. A short text that accompanied “States of Mind”, 
written by Anil Seth, Professor of Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience at the University of Sussex, 
exemplifies the show’s realist framing of yellowbluepink. It is worth quoting at length.
Though largely sidelined during the 20th century, the challenge of revealing the biological basis of 
consciousness is now firmly re-established for our times. Janssens’s piece reminds us of the impor-
tant distinction in science between being conscious at all (conscious level: the difference between 
being awake and being in a dreamless sleep or under anaesthesia) and what we are conscious of 
(conscious content: the perceptions, thoughts and emotions that populate our conscious mind). 
There is also conscious selfhood – the specific experience of being me (or you). Each of these aspects 
of consciousness can be traced to specific mechanisms in the brain that neuroscientists, in cahoots 
with researchers from many other disciplines, are now starting to unravel.1 
Here, then, Seth presents what I take to be a scientific realist perspective. Conscious content, or expe-
rience, including the experience of selfhood are presented as the subject of a scientific research project, they 
have a “biological basis” and are to be “traced to specific mechanisms in the brain”, and as such “unravelled”. 
Janssens’ piece is framed as aiding in this task, its affects serving to remind us, its spectators, of the distinc-
tions that neuroscience takes to exist within consciousness, i.e. “distinctions within science”. In other words, 
the meanings that are assumed to flow from yellowbluepink are ones that sympathetically align the experience 
of the installation with neuroscientific knowledge. And this did happen. I overheard conversations between 
visitors, who, upon exiting the airlock attempted to link their encounter with the piece to “brain activity, or 
neurological mechanisms”; even if these exchanges were vague in terms of detail, they were efforts to marry 
private experience with scientific categories. These conversations in many respects evidence the success of the 
curatorial/institutional framing of yellowbluepink. 
 As per all discursive framings of artworks, at least in relation to the art theoretical armature I employ 
here, yellowbluepink vis-à-vis “States of Mind” constructed a subject position for its spectator. It is my claim 
13) I take it that any discourse provides subject positions, or roles, to be occupied. Therefore, according to Howarth et al, “[e]ach… 
discourse… is a social and political construction that establishes a system of relations between different objects and practices, while 
providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify.” Ibid., 3
1)  Robert Morris Untitled 196, “Arts & Artists,” Tate, accessed 8 November 2017, 
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/morris-untitled-t0132 .
1) Anil Seth, What in the world is consciousness?, “What’s On,” Wellcome Collection, accessed 20th July 2017, 
https://wellcomecollection.org/whats/what-world-consciousness .
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that this role can be characterised by a capacity for scientific realist thinking, or at least the recognition that 
such thinking is p o s s i b le . How so? Let’s return to Seth’s text. I have claimed that Seth frames Yellowbluepink 
as helping the spectator to understand themselves neuroscientifically, to align phenomenal experience with 
scientific categories. (This is the desired meaning for the piece within the context of the “States of Mind” show.) 
This neuroscientific knowledge is necessarily premised upon the deeper, foundational understanding that scien-
tific objectivity is possible. (Seth is confident that consciousness can be unravelled, that neural correlates have 
been found for this phenomenon, and will continue to be discovered.) In other words, what is being presented 
in Seth’s framing of yellowbluepink – fundamentally – is a model of spectatorship in which the art-encounter 
prompts an awareness of the pos s ibi l i t y  of neuroscientific self-understanding. This spectatorial understanding 
underpins those overheard conversations mentioned above. For, it seems to me, that these interlocutors would 
not be attempting their science-style explanations if they did not believe such explanations potentially reaped 
rewards, i.e. if they believed objectivity to be impossible. 
In sum, then, I claim that yellowbluepink as framed by “States of Mind” elicits interpretations that are 
sympathetic to science, the spectator’s experience is gathered up with neuroscientific explanation, taken to be 
legitimate and revealing. These meanings are, in turn, premised upon the underlying assumption, or recognition 
by the spectator that realism is possible. Furthermore, I have also argued that these sympathetic interpretations 
are the basis of science-art’s public engagement ambition, one that can be characterised as the soft-promotion 
of realism. And, as my accounts of those conversations provoked by yellowbluepink attest, in many ways, the 
exhibition does its job very well. But, as an advocate of scientific realism and contemporary art, I think it might 
have been done better, indeed o u g h t  to have been done better. 
I am critical of yellowbluepink vis-à-vis “States of Mind” because the project, according to my reading 
fails to promote its realist agenda with sufficient a mbi t ion . The failure relates to a striking contradiction at 
the heart of the project. The dominant art historical phenomenological interpretation of the genre-type to which 
yellowbluepink belongs directly c ont r a d ic t s  the project’s neuronaturalist framing. On entering Janssens’ 
installation – and for those “in the know” – it is impossible not to be reminded of West Coast minimalism, 
famous for “engulfing” spectators in light.16 There is an intimate historical connection between the two, suffi-
cient to warrant the use of Rosalind E. Krauss’ term “minimal-based” work to characterise yellowbluepink.17 
And, this artworld reading includes an assertion of the human as u n k now a ble  to itself; a minimal-based 
piece such as yellowbluepink is understood to provoke a spectator into the realisation that they are not epis-
temically capable, that realism is not possible. I refer here to the trope of “decentred spectating”, influentially 
articulated by Krauss and inspired by the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.18 Janssens belongs to a genera-
tion of European artists (including Olafur Eliasson and Carsten Höller) who deliberately resuscitated “classic” 
minimalist forms and themes, including phenomenological ideas. As Claire Bishop has put it, “in the 1990s, the 
‘phenomenological’ type of installation art returned as an explicit point of reference for contemporary practi-
16) I refer here to the branch of minimal art that developed in California during the 1960’s, including the artists Larry Bell, Robert 
Irwin and James Turrell. These men were sometimes described as Light and Space practitioners, their work focussing on the phenom-
enal experience of illumination, reflection and transparency.
17) Rosalind E Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture (London: Thames & Hudson, 1977), 279. 
18) This spectator model, although formulated by Krauss some forty years ago, lives on. Claire Bishop’s primer on installation art 
proves useful, providing clear evidence of this. One of the “basic assumptions” of her book is that the “rise of installation art is simul-
taneous with the emergence of theories of the subject as decentred.” Installation Art (London: Tate Publishing, 2010), 13. Installation 
is ubiquitous, perhaps even the dominant form within contemporary art, and therefore its spectator model – the decentred spectator 
– is similarly dominant. 
84
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture (2) 2017
tioners…”19 In other words, the tie between the discourse of decentering and yellowbluepink is extremely tight, 
and this “material-theoretical knot” precedes and haunts that framing attempted by “States of Mind”. 
So, yellowbluepink vis-à-vis ‘States of Mind’ would seem to draw-out directly contradictory readings. It is 
my assertion that these opposing interpretations create a methodological problem for the project, one concerning 
content and its communication. The realist ideas supplied by Seth, for instance, are being communicated in 
a “language” (a minimal-type sculptural vocabulary) firmly tied to an anti-realist position. Put bluntly, then, 
I think this contradiction is an issue for the exhibition’s promotion of its realist, or neuronaturalist agenda, 
which is always liable to be hobbled by it (made confusing, watered-down, or even blocked). 
I recognise, however, that there is a way to deflect this criticism. One can highlight that the contradic-
tion is only evident to art-specialists, those conversant with a certain rarefied disciplinary knowledge. (For 
instance, those interlocutors previously referenced as discussing yellowbluepink in a neuronaturalist manner, 
were not, in any obvious way, concerned with this contradiction.) And, if the aim for yellowbluepink vis-à-vis 
“States of Mind” is to communicate its neuronaturalism far and wide, then confusing a few artworld insiders 
is of no real consequence. 
But, I think, the dismissal of such specialist art knowledge as narrowly niche underestimates its power, 
which I discuss here, as the ability to exert a profound influence, or “shape a world.”20 I assert, therefore, that an 
ambitious science-art project should engage with art-theoretical framings, and, to engage in this way requires 
– as I hope to explain – acknowledging the contradiction identified above.
The best way to resolve this inconsistency, I believe, is by the invention of a new realist spectator model, 
one that replaces and negates the logic of decentring. This is the speculative task pursued in the latter stages of 
this article. My account is indebted to the “neo-rationalism” of Ray Brassier and Peter Wolfendale. In relation 
to the former I borrow from his writing on spectating, which itself draws upon neuro-philosopher Thomas 
Metzinger’s theorisation of an attentional mode, or brain state, called nemocentrism.21 The nemocentric spec-
tator is forged in an encounter with noise music, prompted to recognise “itself” as capable of objective thought 
beyond phenomenal limitation. 22
In order to unpack the interlocking claims made so far, I first need to show that the logic of decentring 
is fundamentally anti-realist.
19) Ibid., 76.
20) I am alluding here to Arthur C. Danto’s useful compound term, the “artworld”. See Arthur C. Danto, “The Artworld”, The Journal 
of Philosophy 61, 19 (196), 71-8.
21) “A nemocentric reality model is one that satisfies a sufficiently rich set of constraints for conscious experience, while at the same 
time not exemplifying phenomenal selfhood… It would, while still being a functionally centred representational structure, not be 
accompanied by the phenomenal experience of being someone.” Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 200), 336.
22) Ray Brassier, Genre is Obsolete, The Auricle Sonic Arts Gallery, accessed 20th July 2017, 
http://auricle.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/201/10/Ray-Brassier-Genre-is-Obsolete.pdf .
In attempting to flesh out Brassier’s account of spectating, and to explicitly position it in relation to contemporary art, I am, to a certain 
extent, following in the footsteps of David Burrows. He has spoken convincingly about nemocentrism in regards to his own practice 
with Plastique Fantastique. I saw him present on this topic at the ‘Plague of Diagrams’ symposium, at the ICA in August of 201. For 
more information on the event see: “Plague of Diagrams,” Exhibitions, Previously at the ICA, The Institute of Contemporary Arts, 
accessed 8.12.2017, https://www.ica.org.uk/whats-on/plague-diagrams .
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The Decentred Spectator
Krauss dramatically illustrates the decentred spectator by way of an account of Michael Heizer’s monumental 
earthwork Double Negative, of 1969.23 The piece consists of two massive trenches one hundred feet long and forty 
deep, these slots face-off against one another across a ravine. As Krauss notes, the enormous scale of the work 
requires a spectator to enter it. She compares the feeling of occupying one of these trenches to our common-
sense understanding of self-hood, with one important exception: 
Because of its enormous size, and its location, the only means of experiencing this work is to be in 
it – to inhabit it the way we think of ourselves as inhabiting the space of our bodies. Yet the image 
we have of our own relation to our bodies is that we are centred inside them; we have k now le d ge 
of ourselves that places us, so to speak, at our own absolute core; we  a re  w hol l y  t r a n s p a re nt 
to  ou r  ow n  c on s c iou sne s s…  In this sense the Double Negative does not resemble the picture 
that we have of the way we inhabit ourselves. For, although it is symmetrical and has a centre (the 
mid-point of the ravine separating the two slots), the centre is one we cannot occupy. 2
The model of self-experience provided by Double Negative is u n l i k e  our habitual one, in that we tend 
to picture ourselves as centred within the body space. This is disqualified in Heizer’s piece because, Krauss 
claims, it is impossible for a spectator to occupy the centre-point. 
Of course, we could counter the “letter” of Krauss’ argument, here, by asserting that it is, in fact, possible 
for a spectator to be positioned between the ravines, they might hover there in a helicopter, perhaps. But, the 
impossibility of “occupation” that Krauss asserts should be understood as a metaphor for the impossibility of 
escaping (in experience) an embodied point-of-view – an insight with which I concur: we d o  always experi-
ence from a particular place, a somewhere, we are, experientially speaking, finite beings. 
However, as is obvious throughout the account, Krauss links this experiential situation to the question 
of k now le d ge ,  specifically self-knowledge, and this is where her position diverges from my own. The strong 
inference of her argument is that the gulf separating knowledge from its self-source, i.e. self-knowledge, is the 
same as that preventing a spectator from experientially encountering the centre-point of Double Negative. The 
gulf, which shows us the limits of embodied experience, is the same one that prevents us (decentres us) from 
k now i n g  ou r s e l ve s . Knowledge is finite in the way that experience is finite.
This is the lesson she draws from Merleau-Ponty.2 For him, experience has a transcendental status i.e. 
it is the hor i z on  of  p o s s ib i l i t y  for the objectivity of our natural and scientific attitudes. To be clear, this 
transcendental horizon is to be understood as a foundational experiential relation between subject and object-
in-appearance.26 Humans are not able to remove themselves from experience, so as to ‘see’ beyond it. In this way 
experience suffers limitation; it is finite. And, this has e pi s tem ic  consequences. Objective thought is secondary 
to – parasitic upon – experience. Thought, therefore, can never overcome finitude; never breach the transcendental 
23) Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, op. cit., 280-81, emphasis added.
2) Ibid., 280.
2) Krauss and the minimalist sculptors themselves were particularly influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception, originally published in 19, the version I refer to was first translated into English in1962 by Paul Kegan, for Routledge.
26) For a convincing and recent description of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental presuppositions see Sebastian Gardner, “Merleau-
Ponty’s Transcendental Theory of Perception” in Sebastian Gardner and Mathew Grist, eds., The Transcendental Turn, (Oxford: 
OUP, 201).
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horizon. We cannot k now  things beyond our finite experiential relation to them.27 Science believes it does but 
this is hubristic. It should be clear then that Krauss’ argument closely follows the Merleau-Pontian line. 
To return to my case study we can now see w hy  the minimalist “style” of yellowbluepink is in sympathy 
with the logic of decentring. We can show this by describing Krauss’ argument as operating in two steps. First, 
a work is recognised by the spectator to be about the limits of his or her own perception, second, the conclu-
sion drawn is that epistemic capacity is equally limited, or decentred. Yellowbluepink conforms neatly to 
“stage one” of the interpretation. As in Heizer’s Double Negative, although on a much more “domestic” scale, 
“experience-as-finite” is the subject matter. The installation calls attention to this by interrupting experiences’ 
usual smooth functioning, gently destabilising it by way of the unfamiliar, fogged situation. The decentring inter-
pretation can then latch onto this aspect drawing its conclusion concerning a consequent epistemic finitude. 
I should acknowledge, here, that Krauss’ explicit target is knowledge, or rationality understood as absolute 
understanding achieved via introspection. Her focus is therefore more circumscribed than Merleau-Ponty’s. 
I agree with Krauss that this rational intuition is impossible. For a properly objective knowledge to be gener-
ated, scientific rationality is necessary, a disciplined and collective thinking together. 
My point is, however, that this “good” version of knowledge, or rationality is not available in her argument. 
In Krauss’ phenomenological reading of rationality she effectively bundles together objectivity and introspec-
tion, taking objectivity to be the absolute truth gained through intuition. Her decentring of rationality obscures 
the possibility of formulating it differently, that is, as the producer of scientific objectivity. What is occluded in 
the strategy of decentring is the possibility that not all objective thought is irremediably finite. Decentring is 
a case of throwing the baby of rationality out with the bath water of introspective self-understanding.28
So, to sum up this section, Krauss’ theorisation posits a spectator who recognises their epistemic limitation 
in the encounter with minimal type art, works such as yellowbluepink. This follows from the way that rationality 
is treated in her account, introspective knowledge stands in for rational knowledge per-se, therefore – by implica-
tion – any notion of realist, objective thought is treated with suspicion, subject to a phenomenological critique.
The Artworld
It is the desire of those neuroscientists working on ‘States of Mind’ that the possibility of objective self-understanding 
is to be prompted by the experience of yellowbluepink. I hope it is now clear how the dominant artworld reading 
of the piece contradicts this desire. But, I still need to justify w hy  I think this matters. This is because I can 
well imagine an argument that agrees there is, indeed, a contradiction, but claims that it is beside the point. 
Such an argument would declare that it does not matter for the implicit aim of the “States of Mind” show, i.e. 
for the promotion of a neuronaturalist agenda.29 I think, however, as already mentioned in my introduction, 
this argument relies on certain unsophisticated assumptions about art. 
27) For Merleau-Ponty this is because “the horizon [is] latent in all experience and itself ever-present and anterior to every determining 
thought”. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Paul Kegan (Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk: Routledge, 1992), 92, emphasis 
added.
28) I should also acknowledge that within Krauss’ account of decentring “sociality” plays a central role. Self-knowledge is decentred, 
not only by “experience”, but also by an awareness that meaning is inter-subjective rather than personal. Although I can agree with 
this sentiment, its general thrust is problematic because this ‘social knowing’ is won, within the phenomenological frame of her argu-
ment, at the expense of objective knowledge.
29) This might well be the position of those responsible for the Wellcome Trust’s public engagement strategy. They could defend against 
my criticism by drawing attention to the success of Janssens’ piece, a highly visible and popular exhibit. They could state that a spec-
tator does not need to be interested in the history of minimalism to appreciate this work. Indeed, without this knowledge they are 
87
Steve Klee, Science-Art: Neuronaturalism Beyond the Decentred Spectator
Artworld Influence
The artworld is a broad socio-cultural structure within which individual art encounters take place. It is a discourse, 
one that extends spatially, but also persists through time; it has a history. As a “world” its i n f luenc e  is much 
wider than any particular exhibition. This is because it is reproduced by a broad range of practices (education-
practices, making-practices, writing-practices, networking/socialising-practices, etc) and institutions (schools 
and universities, studio/technological infrastructure, apparatuses of publishing, (social) media platforms, etc). 
This influence is first and foremost exerted upon the population of “card carrying” members. Indeed, to 
be a member of the artworld is to situate oneself within its beliefs and values.30 But the artworld also has influ-
ence above and beyond this immediate group. Even the most rarefied of its meanings (and values) can shape 
the broader social imagination, albeit most often in circuitous and indirect ways.31 Therefore, to influence one 
person, five hundred, or ten thousand people with an exhibition is one thing, but to influence the value system 
of a world – which can persist for generations – is to operate on an entirely different scale. 
Shaping the Artworld
The current strategy of most science-art projects ignores the artworld. These projects understand the art 
encounter as dyadic, one between an artefact (with realist meaning) and a “pristine” spectator, someone not 
sullied by artworld “values”, thereby able to drink in its message. I am not saying this form of communication 
is impossible, but that it seeks to influence only those pristine spectators, who come to the exhibition, read 
about the exhibition, etc. It aims to communicate with i nd i v idu a l s .32
On the other hand, an ambitious science-art project would attempt to communicate with, so as to shape, 
a world. It must aspire not only to speak with individuals, but with the institutions of art, or, in other words, it 
must aim to communicate with the artworld as a collection of institutions. Art practice and/or philosophy that 
is directed towards this “structural dimension” will be theorised in a manner that a r t i c u l a t e s  its particu-
larity in relation to the broad art-discourse.33
in a much better position to accept yellowbluepink as exemplifying neuroscientific theories. From the perspective I am articulating, 
then, the contradiction would not seem to be important because it doesn’t matter for many individuals who compose the audience. 
The Wellcome Trust, so the argument concludes, is a populist institution that caters for a broad clientele beyond the specialist deni-
zens of the artworld, and this is a strength in terms of its promotional message, which is thereby able to reach lots of people, and of 
different constituencies.
30) As already mentioned I understand any discourse to provide subject positions with which agents identify; this is what I mean by 
“membership”. George Dickie, here, adds more detail, naming specific artworld roles, “[i]n almost every actual society which has an 
institution of art-making, in addition to the roles of artist and public, there will be a number of supplementary artworld roles such 
as those of critic, art teacher, director, curator, conductor, and many more”, George Dickie, “The New Institutional Theory of Art”, 
Proceedings of the 8th Wittgenstein Symposium, 10, 1983, 7–6.
31) We can hold to this “transmission” idea without going the whole hog, wherein art is given a c e nt r a l  a n d  p r i v i l e g e d  role in 
a dramatic “distribution of the sensible”. (I refer here to Jacques Rancière’s influential notion of art-agency: See Jacques Rancière, 
The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill, (London: Continuum, 200). But, none the less, to teach in a British art school is 
to encounter the way that artworld notions, say, in relation to the necessary expressive function of painting, are deeply imbedded 
within European culture. Artworld notions spread into “broader culture”, and each new cohort arrives with a similar spectrum of 
ideas and ambitions.
32) Those pristine spectators don’t need to be ignored, obviously, but the work should address them a n d  operate at the level of the 
artworld too.
33) “[A]rticulation [is] ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articu-
latory practice’. D i s c o u r s e  is ‘the structured totality resulting from this articulatory practice’.” Howarth, Norval, Stavrakaki, eds., 
Discourse Theory and Political Analysis, op. cit., 7, emphasis in the original.
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But, to engage in a successful articulation is to overcome an obstruction; the artworld is already “fixed” by 
an existing set of meanings and values.3 For instance, the ambitious science-art project would have to acknowl-
edge that its aim to communicate a realist message via spectator experience could not straightforwardly utilise 
minimal-based work as a “carrier”, because this genre-type is fixed or “quilted” by its relation to the anti-realist 
logic of decentring. 
Therefore, what is needed is an understanding that – at this level – communication is a form of combat ive 
i nt e r ve nt ion , one aiming to achieve two goals. First, it must attempt to contribute a new “positive content”, 
that is, a realist spectating model tied to a specific genre-type of art. Secondly, the new figure must have a critical 
function; this form of spectating needs to negate the old anti-realist one, usher it off-stage, so as make room 
for its own neuronaturalist meaning.3 To do so, the art-encounter thus theorised, must be understood to have 
a “quality” that is directly antagonistic to the discourse of decentring, i.e. it must not be accommodated by 
phenomenological explanation. It is this resistant quality that allows the new model to negate the old. 
Rationality: Objective Knowledge from No-where
The rest of this article is dedicated to building this new model of spectatorship. In order to do so I first need to 
theorise the realist-rationality upon which this figure stands. This requires providing a non-phenomenolog-
ical account of the relationship between experience and epistemic capacity. In a recent paper Peter Wolfendale 
elegantly laid out the neo-rationalist position, on which I rely.36 Let us begin with his neuroscientific descrip-
tion of experience including self-experience. This is understood, following Metzinger, as a complex biological 
simulation; selfhood is a kind-of feedback loop within it.37 Wolfendale asserts that this system evolved to aid 
the organism to solve certain physical tasks. He gives the example of our ability to simulate the weight of 
objects, a useful knack when presented with a rock that – if of an appropriate heft – might be moved to get at 
nourishing grubs. He describes this intuition of weight as a parochial form of know-how; parochial because it 
is an innate bio-capacity, governed by a particular “local” frame, “our evolutionary confinement to the earth’s 
gravitational field.”38 Weight is a “problem” that can be formulated and solved within the realm of experience. 
And, as Krauss is also aware, this body-knowledge is finite, limited by the particular capacities of a body and 
the context for which those capacities were intended. 
Wolfendale’s characterisation of rationality, on the other hand, breaks decisively with Krauss in cred-
iting it with an i nd e p e nd e nc e  from experience. Reason is understood as a technology that supervenes upon 
biology, “an abstract protocol that has been functionally implemented by the techno-linguistic infrastructure of 
human culture.”39 (It is important to stress, however, that such relative autonomy from physical “wetware” does 
not position rationality as something that cannot be accounted for by science. For instance, Wilfred Sellars – on 
3) Ibid., 8.
3) To believe that artists’ and theorists’ “intentional articulations” are the o n l y  agent of change within art discourse would be 
to vastly underestimate other factors, but, we should not therefore ignore this register. Also, it needs saying that the only hope of 
achieving a re-shaping of art discourse is by collective and persistent intervention.
36) Peter Wolfendale, The Reformatting of Homo Sapiens, paper delivered at the ‘0 Inhuman Symposium’, YouTube, accessed 20th 
July 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1IpDTUhQAU .
37) From this perspective experience is entirely empirical i.e. the simulation can be identified with neurological ‘correlates’, which 
provide “a true neurobiological description”. Thomas Metzinger, Being No One, 303.
38) Peter Wolfendale, The Reformatting of Homo Sapiens, no page number.
39) Peter Wolfendale, Rationalist Inhumanism (Dictionary Entry), Academia.edu, accessed 1 July 2016, 
http://www.academia.edu/26697819/Rationalist_Inhumanism_Dictionary_Entry , 3.
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whom the neo-rationalists draw – has sketched out a philosophical picture in which the ‘technology of reason’ 
emerges from physical, causal relationships, and can be explained without contravening scientific principles.0 
As Brassier says, Sellars and his followers provide a defence of “the autonomy of rationality without violating 
the constraints of naturalism.”)1.
To return to my central point, the relative autonomy of rational cognition renders it capable of positing 
and solving problems beyond any parochial conditions. Wolfendale gives the example of mass, which can only 
be defined r a t ion a l l y  via “precise inferential norms governing its relation to the concepts of force and accel-
eration”. 2 The conceptualisation of mass, therefore, has “enabled us to un-frame our understanding of weight 
and apply it to other gravitational contexts”.3 Therefore, rationality in its grasping of the property mass, is able 
to give an account of the real that exists beyond our finite phenomenal experience. 
Another register in which “un-framing” is a useful term to think through rationality is with regard to 
its inherent sociality; it cannot be framed as an activity performed by one entity. We are collectively caught 
up in, and contribute to, that system of linguistic norms and inferential relations mentioned above. In other 
words, rationality’s “place of enunciation” is anonymous, a point between individual entities, i.e. a no-where. 
To think “from” this anonymous nowhere is the condition of possibility for rational thought.
The Nemocentric Spectator
Brassier’s speculation on nemocentric experience holds the key to a spectator model that would act in consort 
with this account of rationality. Nemocentrism names a specific mental state, which might be induced. Brassier 
describes it thus: “the objectification of experience would generate self-less subjects that understand themselves 
to be no-one and no-where”. An “objectification”, then, results in the loss of self-hood and contextual posi-
tionality, which is to say, a loss of phenomenal experience per-se. I understand objectification here to mean, 
loosely, a “switching off” of phenomenal experience. 
According to Brassier this can occur in relation to certain forms of art that generate and manipulate 
“difficult” sensory material. His preferred example is “noise”. In Genre is Obsolete he focuses on two disci-
plined and stringent groups associated with this aggressively non-generic genre: To Live and Shave in L.A. 
and Runzelstirn and Gurgelstock, the former led by Tom Smith, the latter by Rodulf Eb.er.6 These groups are 
formally inventive enough to remain on the anomalous side of generic categorisation. Their “sound” constantly 
breaks new ground and its “quality” stretches (beyond) the bounds of normal phenomenal experience. Brassier 
hones in on how these groups, unlike “conventional” noise that obliterates detail, maintain, just, the integrity 
of an array of sounds, a sonic complexity or “negentropic overload”, which assaults the spectator with an inas-
0) Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997).
1) Ray Brassier, “Reason is Inconsolable and Non-Conciliatory” a conversation with Suhail Malik in Realism Materialism Art, 
Christopher Cox, Jenny Jaskey, Suhail Malik eds. (Berlin/New York: Sternberg Press & Bard College), 21.
2) Peter Wolfendale, The Reformatting of Homo Sapiens, no page number.
3) Ibid., no page number.
) “I am quite convinced that almost all forms of thinking are things that are distributed processes that we do together. We ’r e 
t h i n k i n g  t o g e t h e r,  r i g ht  n ow.” Thomas Metzinger, Ray Brassier in Conversation with Thomas Metzinger, Senselogic, accessed 
20th July 2017, https://cengizerdem.wordpress.com/201/07/20/ray-brassier-in-conversation-with-thomas-metzinger/ , no page number, 
emphasis in the original.
) Ray Brassier, Against an Aesthetics of Noise, interview with Bram Ieven for Transitzone, “Transitzone”, nY web, accessed 20th July 
2017, http://ny-web.be/transitzone/against-aesthetics-noise.html, no page number.
6) Ray Brassier, Genre is Obsolete, op. cit.
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similable myriad.7 His ultimate claim is that this excessive detail or “incompressibility of…signal’ scrambles 
a spectator’s ability to experience... And the resulting phenomenal destitution can be k now n  by that entity 
which undergoes it.”8
In Metzinger’s terms, outlined above by Wolfendale, it is the bio-simulation-system, the realm of paro-
chial knowledge, which is shutdown. This system maps the body –provides an intuition of its physical limits 
– positioning it within a location. To lose this is to lose phenomenal awareness of oneself as a located embodied 
being. This generates k now le d ge  that you are – in fact – no-where. The nemocentric subject inhabits space 
– undoubtedly – but does not feel a natural and necessary connection to that space, and as such u nd e r s t a nd s 
her or himself – qua rational being – to be irreducible to, not bound by, that material position. At one and the 
same time, the notion of being someone is also obliterated; to turn the bio-system off is to lose oneself – to 
k now  oneself to be no-one in particular, rather, a socially distributed thinker.
What happens here, then, is a fragmentation of the subject into experiential self, and rational self, i.e. an 
“it-self”. The former is momentarily decommissioned, and the latter keeps track of this. (As we have seen this 
is possible, because, as asserted by Wolfendale, conceptual thought has a relative autonomy from biological 
experience.)
Conclusion
The nemocentric spectator-state is, therefore, a forceful encounter with that part of oneself, the “it-self”, respon-
sible for objective rational thought. To be (prompted) beyond phenomenal experience is to fully encounter the 
anonymity of rational being, to recognise oneself as such a being. As we have seen thinking from this (non) 
position is the condition of possibility for objective knowledge. In other words, to think in this way, and to 
recognise oneself – or rather the “itself” – to be doing so, is to be set within, and primed to make use of, that 
web of concepts and inferential relations that enable humankind to gain traction on the real.9
We can say, then, that recognition of oneself as “itself” i s  to understand humankind’s capacity for 
objective thought, including the capacity to construct an objective account of that which humankind i s . 
Nemocentrism is none other than the radical encounter with, recognition of, the ability to think objectively, 
that is, from a position that is no-where. In other words, the nemocentric spectator is a realist a l t e r n at i ve 
to decentring. And, as such, it is the perfect candidate to produce those interpretations desired by “States of 
Mind”, and other science-art projects. This is because a spectatorial recognition of the possibility of objective 
thought is foundational for further speculative interpretations that are in sympathy with particular scientific-
realist knowledge. 
But, as I have tried to argue, in order for science-art theory and practice to have a significant effect, to 
play a role in the ambitious promotion of a realist agenda it must be prepared to engage with artworld meanings 
and values. To do so is to take advantage of the artworld’s reach in space and time, via its institutions, platforms 
and “historical persistence”. To gain these advantages artworks and theories need to be combative, to contest 
existing and contrary meanings and values. This is the challenge that yellowbluepink vis-à-vis “States of Mind” 
did not accept, and the contradiction I have diagnosed is a symptom of the project’s reticence on this front. 
7) Ibid., 6.
8) Ray Brassier, Against an Aesthetics of Noise, no page number.
9) For this nemocentric subject to recognise itself as an anonymous, socially distributed thinker is one such (reflexive) tractable 
insight, an understanding of the nature of rational thought itself. This insight is not gained through introspection, but rather by, what 
we might call, a neo-rationalist exospection.
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Nemocentric art and theory is a better fit with science-art projects, possessing the resources for a combative 
intervention into the artworld, one that might reshape this “culture”. Specifically, nemocentric practice and 
principle would have been the ideal carrier for the scientific-realist agenda of “States of Mind”. This is because 
nemocentrism bre a k s  the discourse of decentring. For, to be nemocentric is to occupy a no-where that surpasses 
its discursive resources. In other words, the nemocentric state, which conjoins phenomenal destitution with 
the survival of reason is antithetic to the phenomenological argument employed by Krauss. The nemocentric 
spectator, therefore, also actively confronts and negates the logic of decentring, providing the potential for an 
ambitious neuronaturalist transformation of the artworld.
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